The Gravest Act of International Relations

The claim that Iraq had such weapons was primordial to the case for fight made by the Bush judicature to Congress, the American public, and the world community as embodied in the United Nations. Certainly the absence of these weapons has been profoundly embarrassing to the administration.

It whitethorn be said that the apparent nonexistence of these weapons in ibn Talal Hussein Hussein's Iraq at the start of 2003 does not, in and of itself, automatically undermine the weapon of mass destruction argument as a justification for the fight. Iraq is known beyond dispute to have had WMD in the past, because it used them in the 1980s, both against Iran and against its own people (Kurds in northern Iraq). It never fully accounted for them, and had a long record of non-cooperation with UN inspectors whose mission was to go over that they were destroyed after the 1991 Gulf War. This non-cooperation led to the inspectors' withdrawal in 1998.

A reasonable presumption could thus be argued that Iraq however possessed some WMD. Even many critics of the war (including this writer) were affect when absolutely none of these weapons turned up. Moreover, a case could be made that Iraq's presumed obstinacy of WMD was sufficient justification for powerful diplomacy to ensure that it was disarmed of these weapons. That is, Iraq might arguably be endanger with war if it did not re-admit the UN inspectors and permit them to complete their unfinished work. (Whether possession of WMD would pass the test of necessity will

This sequence of events totally undermines the WMD justification, and would almost certainly have done so even if WMD had been found. It is as though a police officer ordered a wary to put his hands up and submit to a pat-down for a concealed weapon, the suspect complied -- and the policeman shot the suspect anyway. The non-discovery of WMD is in effect only one a good deal nail in the coffin of the Bush political science's argument.

This leaves the test of "a reasonable chance of conquest.

" The outcome of a battlefield war between the US and Iraq was scarecely in doubt, and in fact the rubbish was quite one-sided. However, if the ultimate war objective was to create a peaceful or democratic Iraq, this outcome is very much in doubt. The Bush Administration seems to have given no serious thought to how to achieve it (Clark, 2004, pp. 88-92); it seems to be presumed -- in malevolency of much expert opinion -- that battlefield victory would be enough. Thus, even whether the Iraq war had a reasonable success of success is questionable.

In fact, two former senior Bush Administration officials, ex-Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neil and "terrorism czar" Richard Clarke, have verbalize -- Clarke under oath -- that the Administration was strongly inclined toward war with Iraq from the time it came to office (Mackay, 2004; "Ex-White House Aide," 2004). Clarke has indicated that on the day after the 9/11 terrorist assail, Bush himself indicated his desire to link the attack to Iraq, though intelligence experts had never found any epochal links between Iraq and al-Qaeda ("Ex-White House Aide," 2004).

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